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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
testamentary transfers by appropriate legislation.
It is only by discarding the tentative trust theory and substituting enabl-
ing legislation that an honest, clear approach to the problem of trust deposits
can be assured.
Pittsburgh, Pa. Ella Graubert.
(Member of Penna. Bar)
THE CRIMINAL ASPECT OF SUICIDE
Suicide was murder at common law.' The crime required the mental
element as well as the physical act.' It was punished by ignominious burial
in the highway with a stake driven through the body and forfeiture of the per-
petrator's goods and chattels to the Crown., A temporary pardon of forfei-
'Hales v. Petit, 1 Plowd. 253, 260, (1565); this interesting case caused Shakespeare to
give it his caustic comment in "Hamlet," Act V. Scene I, see Nat Schmulowitz, "Suicidal
Sophistry", 68 United States Law Review 413; 1 Hale P. C.,411-419; I Hawk. P. C., c. 27,
102-104; II Hawk. P. C., c. 37, 547; Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, "History of the Criminal
Law of England," III, 104; William E. Mikell, "Is Suicide Murder?". 3 Columbia Law Review
393. Reg. v. Burgess, L. & C. 258, is authority for saying that there is no such offense as
self-manslaughter.
21t might also be accidentally according to Hale and Hawkins, as where he who maliciously
attempts to kill another and in pursuance of such attempt unwillingly kills himself. I Hale
P. C. 412-413; I Hawk. P. C., c. 9; the perpetrator must be sane and old enough to entertain
the requisite mental element. Reg. v. Moore, 3 C. 6 K. 319; Reg. v. Doody, 6 Cox C. C.
463; 4 Blackstone 189; Rudolph v. U. S., 36 App. D. C. 379, 385; Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Groom, 86 Pa. 92, 97; Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio 196; McMahon v. State, 168 Ala. 70, 53 So.
89; Rex. v. Donovan, 4 Cox C. C. 429.
3Hales v. Petit, 1 Plowd. 253, 261. "In Bracton's time, a person who committed suicide
in order to avoid conviction for a crime, forfeited his lands, other suicides forfeited their goods
only." This distinction had been dropped by the sixteenth century, Sir James Fitzjames
Stephen, "History of the Criminal Law of England", III, 105; Pollock and Maitland. "History
of English Law", If, 488; Com. v. Mink. 123 Mass. 422; Com. v. Wright, 26 C. C. (Pa.) 666,
667. As to what the felo de se forfeited at common law, it seems clear that he forfeited all
chattels real or personal which he had in his own right; and also all chattels real whereof he
was possessed, either jointly with his wife, or in her right; and also all bonds and other per-
sonal things in action belonging solely to himself; and also all personal things in action, and
as some say, entire chattels in possession, to which he was entitled jointly with another, or
any account, except that of merchandise, But it is said that he forfeited a moiety only of such
joint chattels as might be severed, and nothing at all of what he was possessed as executor or
administrator. I Hawk. P. C., c. 27, s. 7. The blood of a telo dc se was not corrupted, nor
his lands of inheritance forfeited, nor his wife barred of her dower, I Hawk. P. C., c. 27, s. 8,;
1 Plowd. 253, 262; I Hale P. C. 413. The will of felo de se therefore became void as to his
personal property, but not as to his real estate. 1 Plowd. 253, 262. No part of the personal
estate of a felo de se vested in the king before the self-murder was found by some inquisition,
and consequently the forfeiture thereof was saved by a pardon of the offense before such find-
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tures was granted at the time of the Restoration of Charles II., Today this
punishment no longer remains. In the United States, forfeiture of goods for
suicide and regulation of burial were early abolished or have long fallen into
disuse.5 while in England these vicarious penalties have been removed by
statute.6 The act of suicide, however, remains a crime in England and in
some states by the common law. 7  Suicide loses its status as a crime only
ing, 5 Co. Rep. 110, 3 Inst. 54, I Saund. 362, 1 Sid. 150, 162. If there was, no such pardon,
the whole was forfeited immediately after such inquisition, from the time of the act done by
which the death was caused, and all intermediate alienations and titles were voided, 1 Plowd.
253, 263-264; I Hale P. C. 29; 5 Co. Rep. 110; Finch L. 216; Chitty's note in Sharswood's 4
Blackstone 190.
41n interpreting the Statute of Pardons, 12 Car. II, ch. 11, which granted a general pardon
to all persons guilty of any felony except murder it was held that suicide was not murder
within the purview of the statute, Rex. v. Ward, 1 Lev. 8; Rex. v. Warner, 1 Keb. 66; Rex.
v. Ward, I Keb. 548; Lock v. Etherington, 1 Keb. 695.
. 5Forfeiture for suicide was abolished in Pennsylvania by William Penn, Proprietary and
Governor, in his charter of 1701; this was subsequently continued in the Constitutions of 1790,
1838, and 1874, Art. 1, Sec. 19; Burnett v. People, 204 IIl. 208, 68 N. E. 505. A dishonorable
burial was accorded suicides in colonial Massachusetts for by statute in 1660 every self-murd-
erer was denied the privilege of being buried in the common burying-place of Christians. but
was to be buried in some common highway and a cartload of stoneJ laid upon the grave, .'as
a brand of infamy, and as a warning to others to beware of the like damnable practices."
"That statute, though fallen into disuse, continued in force until many years after the adoption
of the Constitution of the Commonwealth," Com. v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 426, per Gray, C.
J. This statute was repealed in 1823, May v. Pennell, 101 Me. 516, 64 At. 885, 7 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 286.
633 & 34 Vict., c. 23, (1870). It is said that the effort made by the common law to deter
men from committing suicide by threatening degradations to be inflicted on the suicide's corpse
and the forfeiture of his goods met with some measure of success. The first by a natural, if
unreasoning, association of ideas was often a potent deterrent and the second, a vicarious pun-
ishment falling wholly upon his surviving family, was likely to appeal strongly to his sense
of affection. Burial lost its gruesome aspect in 1824 and was replaced by burial between 9
and 12 o'clock at night without service. Confiscation of goods was abolished In the general
abolition of forfeitures for felony in 1870. In 1882 every penalty save denial of interment in
full Anglican form was removed. Long before abolition of common law penalties the popular
disapprobation of them had gone far in reducing the number of cases in which they were in-
flicted. Coroner's juries availed themselves of the slightest grounds for pronouncing the act of
suicide to have been done during a fit of insanity. If the evidence disclosed any source of
anxiety which might have been a motive for the act, this anxiety was declared to have un-
settled his mind; if no motive could be found, then the apparent causelessness of the act was
declared itself to be proof of insanity. This practice of "pious perjury" as it is called by
Blackstone became so inveterate that it survived the abolition of the penalties which were its
cause and excuse, and in England jurors are in the habit of pronouncing on utterly inadequate
grounds a verdict of insanity, forgetting that such a verdict may throw upon the family of the
deceased an undeserved stigma gravely affecting their matrimonial, social, or commercial pros-
pects. Men are quick to imagine the physical and mental influence of heredity.
7Rex v. Russell, I Moody 356, (1832); Rex v. Mann, 2 K. Bk 107, (1914); Rex v. Hop-
wood, 8 Cr. App. R. 140; McMahon v. State, 168 Ala. 70, 53 So. 89; State v. Levelle, 34 S.
C. 120, 13 S. E. 319; Com. v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356; Com. v. Mink, 123 Mass. 429; State v,
Carney, 69 N. J. L. 478, 55 At. 44.
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when the common law rule is expressly or impliedly repealed by statute or
constitutional provision., The act of suicide ranges in the various jurisdic-
tions of the United States from a felony to no offense.'
In a civil suit in Pennsylvania a lower court said, "In the legal accepta-
tion of the term (suicide) it is self-murder, the felonious taking of one's life.""0
The Supreme Court affirmed this case in every detail." thus adopting the com-
mon law rule as to suicide. With this Supreme Court opinion before him, an-
other lower court judge in the only criminal case directly dealing with suicide
said, "Calling suicide self-murder is a curt way of justifyinj an indictment
and trial of an unfortunate person who has not the fortitude to bear any more
of the ills of this life. His act may be a sin, but it is not a crime; it is the re-
sult of disease. He should be taken to a hospital and not sent to a prison. ""
Saying that he who attempts suicide should be sent to a hospital is but the
modern way of stating a finding of insanity in the case of a suicide, which
situation was lamented by Blackstone'' and Hawkins" two centuries ago.
0Reg. v. Doody. 6 Cox C. C. '163: Com. v. Dennis. 105 Mass. 162; Com. v.
Mink, 123 Mass. 428. Com. v. Wright, 26 C. C. (Pa.) 666 says that since the Constitution of
1790. which took away the forfeiture of suicide's goods, there has been no punishment for
suicide, and therefore suicide is not a crime. Burnett v. People, 204 I11. 208, evades this point
by saying, "In the vic-,v we entertain of the cise at bar it is not necessary that suicide be held
to be a crime;" although the court favors the view of Com. v. Mink, and Blackburn v. State,
23 Ohio 146, both of which are based on the repeal of suicide as a crime by statutory implica-
tion. May v. Pennell, 101 Me. 516, 64 At. 885, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 286, says that by repeal
of the Massachusetts statute providing for an iqnominions burial of suicides "the common law
of England upon this subject was thus modified in Massachusetts and suicide ceased to be a pun-
ishable offense. The ground work for the English doctrine that an attempt to commit it was
a misdemeanor was thus removed. If it was a misdemeanor by the common law of England.
it ceased to be such under the laws of Massachusetts. and has never been recognized as a part
of the common law of Maine ..... The constructions of their (Massachusetts) statutes
. .. . are in substance and effect precisely like own own." Penal Code of Texas. Art. 3.
9Felony-State v. Levelle, 34 S. C. 120, 13 S. E. 319; Com. v. Hicks, 118 Ky. 637, 82 S.
W. 265; State v. Carney, 69 N. J. L. 478, 55 At. 44 ; unlawful and rnalum in se-Com, v. Mink,
123 Mass. 422; no offense-Grace v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. 193, 69 S. W. 529; Sanders v. State, 54
Tex. Cr. 101, 112 S. W. 68: State v. Campbell, 251 N. W. 717, Iowa, 1933.
'0Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Groom, 86 Pa. 92, 93, (1878).
1"Ibid., 99.
2om. v. Wright, 26 C. C. (Pa.) 666, 669, (1902), Arnold, P. J.
13"The party must be of years of discretion and in his senses, else it is no crime. But
this excuse ought not to be strained to that length to which our coroner's juries are apt to
carry it, viz., that the very act of suicide is an evidence of insanity; as if every man who acts
contrary to reason had no reason at all : for the same argument would prove every other crim-
inal non compos, as well as the self-murderer." 4 Blackstone 189.
4""But here I cannot but take notice of a strange notion, which has unaccountably pre-
vailed of late, that every one who kills himself, must be non compos of course; for it is said to
be impossible, that a man in his senses should do a thing so contrary to nature and to all sense
and reason. If this argument be good, self-iurder can be no crime for a madman can' be
guilty of none. But it is wonderful that the repugnancy to nature and reason which is the
highest aggravation of this offense, should be thought to make it impossible to be any crime at
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It is immaterial whether the act of suicide is criminal so far as the per-
petrator is concerned for he is beyond punishment by the courts. 15 The ques-
tion is important, however, in determining the criminality of those who are
present, aiding, and abetting; those who hire, procure, and assist; those who
attempt to commit suicides; those who conspire to the commission of a suicide;
those who solicit suicide; the duty to prevent suicide; and determining the
position of suicide in the field of constructive crime.
PRINCIPAL IN THE SECOND DEGREE
"Principals in the second degree are those who are present, aiding and
abetting the commission of a felony. ' ' 16  At common law the principal in the
second degree to suicide is held guilty of murder.17 In the courts of the
United States, the principal in the second degree is punished according to the
status of the act of suicide as a crime, or else the particular offense is regulated
all which cannot but be the necessary consequence of this position, that none but a madman can
be guilty of it. May it not with as much reason be argued that the murder of a child or of a
parent is against nature and reason, and consequently that no man in his senses can commit it?
But has a man therefore no use of his reason? Why may not the passions of grief and dis-
content tempt a man knowingly to act against the principles of nature and reason in this case,
as those of love, hatred and revenge, and such like, are too well known tal do in others?" I
Hawk. P. C., c. 27, s. 3.
15"The law of England wisely and religiously considers that no man hath a power to de-
stroy life, but by commission from God, the author of it; and, as the suicide is guilty of a
double offense, one spiritual, in invading the prerogative of the Almighty, and rushing into his
immediate presence uncalled for; the other temporal, against the king, who hath an interest in
the preservation of all his subjects: the law has therefore ranked this among the: highest crimes.
making it a peculiar species of felony, a felony committed on one's self. . . . But now
the question follows, what punishment can human laws inflict on one who has withdrawn him-
self from their reach? They can only act upon what he has left behind him, his reputation and
fortune; on the former, by an ignominious burial in the highway, with a stake driven through
his body; on the latter, by a forfeiture of all his goods and chattels to the king: hoping that
his care for either his own reputation or the welfare of his family would be some motive to re-
strain him from so desperate and wicked an act." 4 Blackstone 189. Statistics indicate that
dread of punishment beyond the grave is still a potent and prevalent deterrent from self-
destruction. 25 Encyclopedia Americana 806.
-eWeston v. Com., Ill Pa. 261, 263.
37Rex v. Tyson, R. & R. 523, (1823); Reg. v. Allison, 8 C. & P. 418. (1838): Reg. v.
Jessop. 16 Cox C. C. 204. (1877); Rex v. Stormonth, 61 P. J. 729, (1897); Rex v. Abbott, 67
P. J. 151, (1903); Rex v. Symonds, 1922 Times Dec. 19, (1922). In Reg. v. Allison is report-
ed a case of the time of James I in which a man and wife agreed to commit suicide together
upon the suggestion of the husband. They both partook of poison which he procured, the
husband died but the wife recovered. Upon her trial for the murder of heA husband she was
acquitted solely on the ground that being the wife of the deceased, she was under his control:
and inasmuch as the proposal to commit suicide had been first suggested by him, it was con-
sidered that she was not a free agent and therefore the jury, under thd direction of the judge
who tried the case, pronounced a verdict of not guilty, State v. Jones, 86 S. "C. 17. 67 S. E.
160, (1910).
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by statute.18 Thus, some courts adopt the doctrine of the common law;Ie the
Texas courts find the abetter guiltless because suicide is no crime in that
state: 20 while other courts adopt another theory in order to punish the abetter.
These latter courts hold the abetter to be a murderer because he either com-
pelled the victim by threats to do acts which result in the victim's death2' or
he committed murder by means of an innocent human agent.22
Similarly, where the defendant inflicted a mortal wound on the victim,
and the latter then slashed his throat with the intent to commit suicide, the act
of the deceased was not an efficient intervening cause but merely a contribut-
ing cause and defendant was found guilty of manslaughter.2 If a person
being attacked shall, from apprehension of immediate violence, which is well
grounded and justified by the circumstances 2 4 throw himself in an attempt to
escape into a river and be drowned, the person attacking him is guilty of
murder: the death being the guilty act of him who compelled the deceased to
take the step.'5
The question as to whether or not a person inciting suicide is a principal
or an abetter is usually made to depend on whether or not he is present,
bringing persuasion to bear upon the other at the time the fatal deed is done.6
Thus one who furnishes poison to a guilty agent or accomplice to be adminis-
tered by him, who administers it accordingly, is an accessory before the fact
to the murder; but if he stands by and counsels or encourages the act of ad-
ministering it, he is a principal in the second degree. In such a case, if the
deceased took the poison in the presence of the giver, but not in that of the
person who first procured it, and died, the procurer is the accessory before the
fact and the giver is the principal in the murder..27 A rule which seems to
cover the whole ground is that of Burnett v. People:2' that an act of the prin-
cipal, or another, done pursuant to the will of the accessory, is the act of the
accessory.
lSState v. Ludwig, 70 Mo. 412, (1879). By statute in Missouri, every person who "de-
liberately assists" another in the commission of self-murder is declared guilty of manslaughter
in the first degree. State v. Webb, 216 Mo. 378, 115 S. W. 998.
19Com. v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356. (1816). This case was decided when suicide was still
punished for forfeiture of goods and ignominious burial.
2eGrace v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. 193, 69 S. W. 529, (1902); Sanders v. State, 54 Tex. Cr.
101, 112 S. W. 68, (1908). The position of the Texas courts is practically neutralized by the
fact that the specific act of inciting or abetting suicide is made punishable by statutory enact-
ment. 66 L. R. A. 307.
2"Adams v. People, 109 I1. 444-jump from train; Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio 146---swal-
low poison; State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa 477--drown.
21Bumett v. People, 204 Ill. 208, 68 N. E. 505, 66 L. R. A. 304.
23People v. Lewis, 124 Cal. 551, (1889).
24State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa 477.
25Reg. v. Pitts, C. & M. 284.
2666 L. R. A. 305.
27Vaux and Ridley's Case, Kel. C. C. 52.
28204 Ill. 208, 68 N. E. 505, 66 L. R. A. 304.
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ACCESSORY BEFORE THE FACT
The accessory before the fact is "one who, though absent at the commis-
sion of the felony, procures, counsels, or commands another to commit said
felony subsequently perpetrated, in consequence of such procuring, counsel
or command.' 2 At common law the accessory before the fact to a suicide
could not be tried because of the common law rule that the principal in the first
degree must be first tried and convicted, and since the principal in the first
degree was beyond human trial the accessory before the fact was allowed to
go unpunished. 30 This defect in the law has been remedied by statute and
now accessories are tried and held liable to the same punishment as principals
even though the principal has not been taken, tried and punished.3' Since
this statute, accessories before the fact to suicide have not gone unpunished
in those forums where the common law is followed. 2 A legal solecism arises,
however, in these courts which hold that suicide is not a crime, and in these
states those persons who procure suicide are guilty of no crime."s
There is no sound practical reason why the procurer of suicide should go
unpunished. Dean William Trickett advanced the theory that although one
who procures, persuades, aids, and abets another to commit suicide, but is
absent at the time of the act, can be shown to be an accessory before the fact,
and that by the Act of March 31, 1860, Sec. 44, an accessory may be indicted
and tried as a principal, yet in order to have an accessory and a principal
there must be a crime; since Com. v. Wright- holds suicide is not a crime, it is
futile to prove an accessory or a second degree principal to suicide. Hence to
escape this result Dean Trickett holds the act to be the commission of murder
through an innocent human agent, that agent being the victim himself.- Dean
Trickett's view has been upheld in People v. Roberts.35
In order to convict the abetter as an accessory before the fact he must
procure the means to commit the act with the intent that it be taken by the
2OWilliam Trickett, 2 Criminal Law in Pennsylvania 757.
80Rex v. Russell, 1 Moody 356, (1832); Reg. v. Leddington, 9 C. & P. 79, (1839).
a'24 6 25 Vict.. c. 23, c. 94; Act of March. 31. 1860, P. L. 427, Sec. 44, (Pa.); and
similar statutes have been adopted in practically all states.
82Reg. v. Gaylor, I D. & B. 288; McMahon v. State, 168 Ala. 70, 53 So. 89. Burnett v.
People, 204 111. 208, 68 N. E. 505, 66 L. R. A. 304: and State v. Lindsey, 19 Nev. 47, 5 Pac.
822, find that that malice in the accessory is an essential element to convict him of murder.
3sGrace v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. 193, 69 S. W. 529; Sanders v. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 101, 112
S. W. 68.
3,26 C. C. (Pa.) 666.
85l3 Forum (Dickinson School of Law) No. 4, 124, "A may induce or aid B to do an act
which, conceived as B's act, is innocent-in the sense that the law does not punish it-but
which may be regarded also as A's act, and in this wise is criminal."
36211 Mich. 187. 178 N. W. 690, 13 A. L. R. 1253, (1920)-the court avoided the ques-
tion of accessory before the fact and the defendant was found guilty of murder by poisoning
because he inixed the poison and placed it within reach so that his invalid wife cold drink it.
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deceased;".1 but if the abetter merely procures the means, whereby the act is
committed, without the intent that it be taken by the deceased, then he is not
guilty of murder either as principal or accessory.-"
By these statutes which make the accessory before the fact subject to
trial and punishment as if a principal, the further question arises of which
procurers come within the comprehension of the statutes. In construing the
Act of 11 & 12 Vict. providing for punishment of accessories before the fact
as principals it has been held that one who counsels or advises another to com-
mit suicide may be punished for that offense.;;:' Bishop says that statutes mak-
ing an accessory before the fact a principal should subject one who instigates
suicide to punishment.-0 The same view was taken in Com. u. Hicks," on
the theory that the object of the statute was to make the punishment of the ac-
cessory entirely independent of the conviction or punishment of the principal
and that the case was the same as if A who had killed B at C's instance should
kill himself immediately thereafter. But in Rex V. Russell - it was held that
the statute 7 Geo. IV providing for the trial of accessories although the prin-
cipal "had not been tried and convicted" was to be construed as extending to
those persons only who were before the statute triable either with or after the
principal, not to make those triable who before could never have been tried.
Dean Trickett says it "operates only where a person is an accessory. But
there can be no accessory at common law unless there is a different principal
felony", consequently Dean Trickett decided that the instigator was the prin
cipal.43 In New York the problem is definitely settled by statute.4 4 There
the accessory before the fact is held guilty of manslaughter.!"
A person who, considered as either a principal or an accessory before the
fact, aids or actively encourages another to commit suicide certainly should be
subjected to the same punishment as a murderer. 46 "It is certainly a serious
defect in the law if a person who wishes to get rid of another can with impun-
ity encourage and assist him to make way with himself."
4
1
ATTEMPT
The attempt to commit suicide is at common law an attempt to commit a
felony and therefore indictable as a misdemeanor."; Whether the attempt to
37Rex v. Russell, 1 Moody 356.
38Reg. v. Fretwell, L. & C. 161, (1862).
39Reg. v. Gaylor, 0. & B. 288.
' 0Bishop's 2 Criminal Law 683. The same doctrine is announced in 21 American and
English Encyclopedia of Law, 2d. ed., 93.
"1118 Ky. 637, 82 S. W. 265.
'l Moody 356.
4a13 Forum (Dickinson School of Law) No. 4, 124.
"Sec. 175 Penal Code of New York, (1881).
"People v. Kent, 41 Misc. (N. Y.) 191.
'6Bishop's 2 Criminal Law 683.
'Wilbur Larremore, "Suicide and the Law," 17 Harvard Law Review 331, 338.
'sReg. v. Moore, 3 C. 6 K. 319, (1852); Reg. v. Doody. 6 Cox C. C. 463o (1854).
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commit suicide is today an indictable offense is a question on which, the courts
are flatly divided. In England 4° and New Jerseys' it has been held, following
the common law, that the attempt to commit suicide is a crime. In Pennsyl-
vania,5 Maine.2- and Massachusetts5 3 it has been held that the attempt to
commit suicide is not a crime. In New York, North Dakota, and South Da-
kota the attempt at suicide was made a felony by statute.- The attempt at
suicide is no longer a crime in New York." The New Jersey courts have
adopted the correct view. In State v. Carney16 it was decided that "as there
is no independent enactment making attempt at suicide a crime, that whether
it is a crime in this state will depend upon whether or not it was a crime at
common law," The court then cites Reg. v. Doody and Reg. v. Burgess and
says that even though these English cases were decided after the Revolution
the cases hold that it always has been the common law of England that one
guilty of suicide was lelo de se, and therefore by the common law of New
Jersey an attempt to commit suicide is a crime.
The Massachusetts courts in Corn. v. Dennis and Com. v. Mink clearly
state that attempts at suicide were criminal at common law. The earlier case
held that attempts were not criminal in Massachusetts because the common
law offense had been repealed by implication by a statute. This statute de-
clares that criminal attempts shall be punished according to the punishment
for the completed offense, and since the completed offense is beyond terrestrial
punishment the attempt is not punished. 7 Eight years later in Com. v. Mink,
Gray, C. J., said, "Suicide is not technically a felony in Massachusetts because
of a statute, but being unlawful and criminal as malurn in se, any attempt to
commit it is likewise unlawful and criminal.""'
By following the Dennis case, the Maine court came to the conclusion that
an attempt to commit suicide is not an indictable offense because it ceased to
be such under the law of Massachusetts. and has never been recognized as a
part of the common law of Maine. The Maine statute in this respect is the
same as the Massachusetts statute.55
4OReg. v. Doody, 6 Cox C. C. 463; Reg. v. Burgess, 9 Cox C. C. 247, (1862); Rex v.
Mann, 2 K. B: 107, (1914); an attempt to commit suicide is a common law misdemeanor pun-
ishable by fine or imprisonment with or without hard labor.
50State v. Carney, 69 N. J. L. 478. 55 At. 44.
5'Com. v. Wright, 26 C. C. (Pa.) 666.
15ZMay v. Pennell, 101 Me. 516, 64 At. 885, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 286.
53Com. v. Dennis. 105 Mass. 162.
54Sec. 178 of the Penal Code of New York, (1881), "every person guilty of attempting
suicide is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in a state prison not exceeding two
years or by a fine not exceeding $1,000."
85This is true since 1919. 25 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 125.
5669 N_ J. L. 478, 55 At. 44.
6'Com. v. Dennis, 105 Mass. 162.
58123 Mass. 422.
597 L. R. A. (N. S.) 286 (Note). By interpretation of the Hawaiian Penal Code, the
attempt at suicide is not an indictable offense, King v Ashee. 2 Am. L. R. 794, (1868).
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The only Pennsylvania case dealing with the attempt to commit suicide is a
lower court case. Com. v. Wright,60 which declares that it cannot be a crime to
commit an act which, if it is accomplished, is not a crime.6' The court -says
the Act of 18602 which punishes the attempt to commit murder "plainly means
an attempt by any one person upon any other person and not upon himself for
the reason that it is not murder for a person to commit suicide, for as said by
Chief Baron Pollock (referring to Reg. v. Burgess) there is no such offense as
self-manslaughter, and there is a vast difference between inflicting a wound
on one's self with that intent." The court here overlooks the common law
definition of homicide which, stated by BlackstoneC 3 is : "Felonious homicide is
an act of a very different character from the the former (referring to excusable
homicide), being the killing of a human creature, of any age or sex, without
justification or excuse. This may be done either by killing one's self, or an-
other man." Dean William Trickett says. "Homicide is the criminally caus-
ing the death of a human being
.
."64
From the standpoint of legal reasoning, the courts should hold that attempt
at suicide is an indictable criminal offense. In fact, the courts could say that
the attempt at suicide is a separate, distinct, substantive crime. It is compar-
able to the crime of burglary which is the doing of certain enumerated physical
acts with the intent to commit a felony. Attempt at suicide is the doing of at
least one physical act with the intent to commit a felony-the felony being
self-murder.
The argument that in the United States suicide is not a crime because it
cannot be punished is readily answered; for this reasoning makes the existence
of a crime depend on the punishment whereas the punishment depends on the
existence of the crime. 65 The fallacy of this reasoning is further shown by
Fort, J., in State u. Carney,"" who said. "Suicide is none the less criminal be-
cause no punishment can be inflicted. It may not be indictable because the
dead cannot be indicted. If one kills another and then kills himself is he any
the less a murderer because he cannot be punished?" The answer to Fort's
argument is found in Corn. v. Wright, that a punishment of forfeiture and
ignominious burial formerly was provided whereas this punishment has now
been finally abrogated. There is a distinction between failure to provide
6026 C. C. (Pa.) 666.
61"In Pennsylvania we have never inflicted the ecclesiastical punishment for the spiritual
offense involved in suicide, and the punishment for the temporal offense was expressly abol-
ished by the Constitution of 1790. re-adopted in 1838 and 1874, which declares that 'the estates
of such persons as shall destroy their own lives. shall descend or vest as in the cases of natural
death,* and, therefore, as there is no punishment there is no crime." Com. v. Wright, 26 C. C.
(Pa.) 666, 667, 668.
62Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 403, Sec. 82.
634 Blackstone 188.
64William Trickett, 2 Law of Crimes in Pennsylvania 766.
65William L. Clark, Jr., "Handbook of Criminal Law," William E. Mikell, ed., 216, (1915).
6669 N. J. L. 478, 55 At. 44,
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punishment for any case and inability to inflict punishment in a particular case.
It is important today to determine what disposition should be made of at-
tempts at suicide, regardless of the holding as to whether or not suicide itself
is a crime. There is a grave doubt whether punishment should be impQsed on
the man who, of his volition, tries to take his own life. If the attempt is made
an indictable offense this undesirable situation arises : that the perpetrator will
strive more earnestly to make the attempt successful.7 This is true in every
case, however, in which an offensive act is made criminal : that the wilful per-
petrator will try to complete his act in such a manner that he will not be
apprehended and punished. The unnatural desire to take one's own life is
usually caused in American cases by despondency.68  This is a temporary
condition which will gradually wear away leaving the former sufferer with a
normal love of life. In European cases the chief cause is mental disorder.6 9
In states where an attempt to commit suicide is a criminal offense, and
where more severe penalties are imposed on criminals for successive offenses,
it would be interesting to inquire whether a second attempt would subject the
offender to life imprisonment, and whether a third attempt would subject the
habitual offender to capital punishment. If such would be the result, it would
follow that three unsuccessful attempts at suicide would require the state to
complete the unsuccessful job started by the attempted suicide.
Public opinion generally has seemed to reach the stage that it no longer
recognizes suicide as a crime and therefore there are scarcely any criminal
proceedings against those who attempt suicide. Even in England the practice
persists of the coroner's jury pronouncing that the act was the result. of insan-
ity, thus allowing the perpetrator a full Christian burial.70 The family is
spared the greater of two evils, for the perpetrator is said to die insane instead
of felo de se. Consequently when the completed act is not popularly counten-
anced as an act of criminal nature, the argument succeeds that the unsuccess-
ful attempt should not be criminally punished. Even in those states where it
is reasonably held that the attempt is criminal, prosecutions against those per-
sons who do attempt suicide are not promoted, for there is only one reported
case in each of these jurisdictions. In New York, where the attempt was a
felony by statute for thirty-eight years, it was said that policemen frequently
were seen waiting at hospitals to arrest persons who had attempted suicide. On
the other hand, in North and South Dakota where the attempt has been made
a felony by statutory enactment, cases coming within the statute are not
prosecuted."'
In order to compromise the two conflicting views as to whether or not the
67Cm. v. Dennis, 105 Mass. 162; Com. v. Wright. 26 C. C. (Pa.) 666.
6825 Encyclopedia Americana 806. (1920).
69Morcelli "Suicide," 278.
7025 Encyclopedia Americana 807.
"1Com. v. Wright, 26 C. C. (Pa.) 666; May v. Pennell. 101 Me. 516, 64 At. 885, 7 L. P.
A. (N. S.) 286.
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attempt at suicide is criminal, it is possible to go back of the act to the motive.
There are two opposite motives which prompt suicide: noble and base. It
is the noble motive which prompted some of the old saints to commit suicide
in order to protect their chastity, 72 while it is the base motive which encour-
ages the coward who has suffered financial losses or unrequited love to desert
his survivors and force his family into the world without attempting to pro-
vide for them. Thus, as in the common law crimes of burglary and forgery
where corrupt motive is an indispensable element of the crime, so too in sui-
cide, if bad motive is made an essential element of the crime this would allow
the courts to punish the dastardly attempts and let go unpenalized the justified
attempts.
It is submitted that the better of these two views is that attempt at suicide
should be criminally punished, and it is immaterial what motive, whether good
or bad, instigated the attempt to take a human life. 3
CONSPIRACY
"A conspiracy," says McClain, 74 "is a combination of two or more per-
sons by concerted action to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or
some purpose not in itself criminal, by criminal or unlawful means." Suicide
may or may not be one of those acts or effects, which, though not criminalized
nor penalized, nor even considered as unlawful, are looked on with certain
disfavor and regret by the law's ministers. Nevertheless, the conspiracy to
commit some of these acts is criminally punished.75 There is little doubt that
the conspiracy to commit suicide should be one of these separate substantive
crimes.
In the only case discussing conspiracy to commit suicide/6 it was held
that where two persons enter upon a suicide pact, "defendant abandoned his
purpose of committing suicide, and endeavored to persuade the deceased to
also abandon it, that he had done all that the law could exact of him" because
the defendant has "the right to repent of his ill-considered promise to commit
suicide with the deceased."
SOLICITATION
It is an indictable offense at common law to solicit another to commit any
crime amounting to a felony, although the solicitation is of no effect and the
72Kilbur Larremore, "Suicide and the Law," 17 Harvard Law Review, 331, 332
78See dicta in State v. Ehlers, 98 N. J. L. 236, 119 At. 15, (1922). White, J., to the
effect that the attempt is punished "because the state has a deep interest and concern in the
preservation of the life of each of its citizens, and (except in cases of self-defense) does not
either commit or permit to any individual, no matter how kindly the motive, either the right or
the privilege of destroying such a life, except in punishment for a crime and in the manner
prescribed by law."
74McClain's 2 Criminal Law 157.
75William Trickett, I Law of Crimes in Pennsylvania 391.
teState v. Webb, 216 Mo. 378, 115 S. W. 998, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1142, (1909).
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crime is not in fact committed. 7  Thus solicitation to commit suicide was a
crime at common law because suicide was considered a felony.78 One who
solicits another to commit a felony is guilty of a misdemeanor only, if the fel-
ony is not committed.7 If the felony is committed, he is guilty as accessory
before the fact if absent, and as principal in the second degree if present, at
the time of its commission.80 Solicitation to commit suicide should be pun-
ished criminally. This can be accomplished by following the common law
rule, or by finding the solicitor guilty of seeking the killing of a human being
by means of the innocent human agent theory.
DUTY TO PREVENT SUICIDE
The question whether a duty exists to prevent the commission or attempt
of suicide arises in interesting situations. It was held at common law that
everyone has the same right and duty to interpose and save a life from being
so unlawfully and criminally taken that he would have to defeat an attempt to
take unlawfully the life of a third person.81 Today no conviction could be had
if one man refuses to prevent another from taking his own life. It is a moral
duty and not a legal one.12 A legal duty exists today only in cases of close re-
lationship, as parent-child,3 husband-wife,14 master-seaman, 8 niece-aunt, 6
grandparent-grandchild.97
In a recent English case88 the defendant was charged with sitting by and
watching his wife drown their two children and then drown herself. The
trial jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter of both children and the
wife. On appeal it was found that the relationship of husband and wife and
that of parent and child placed the defendant under a positive duty to interfere
and his failure to do so was tantamount to encouragement. He was therefore
held an accessory before the fact and guilty of murder in the second degree.
The appellate court was justified in finding the relationship of husband and
wife placed the defendant under a positive duty to interfere and his failure to
7716 Corpus Juris 117.
7S1 East P. C. 219; Rex v. Russell, 1 Moody 356; Rex v. Clerk, 7 Mod. 16; Hales v. Petit,
1 Plowd. 253, 260, 261; Rex v. Ward, 1 Lev. 8.
79Com. v. Randolph, 146 Pa. 83.
S0Bigley v. Com., 22 Ky. 1546, 60 S. W. 847.
81Marlin v. Ayliffe, Cro. Jac. 134, (1685); 2 Rol. Ab. 559; I Hawk. P. C., c. 60 s. 23.
829 Forum (Dickinson School of Law) 222, 223; People v, Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113
N. W. 1128, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1020, 121 Am. St. Rep. 617, 13 Ann. Cas. 39.
83State v. Behen, 72 Iowa 533, 34 N. W. 319; Rex v. Russell, Vict. L. R. 59; Gibson v.
Com., 106- Ky. 360, 50 S. W. 532, 90 Am. St. Rep. 230.
84Rex v. Russell, Vict. L. R. 59; Territory v. Manton, 8 Mont. 95, 19 Pac. 387; State v.
Smith, 65 Me. 257.
811U. S. v. Knowles, '4 Sawy. (U. S.) 517, Fed. Cas. No. 15, 540.
S8Reg. v. Instan, 17 Cox C. C. 602
87Reg. v. Nicholls, 13 Cx C. C. 75.
$$Rex v. Russell, Vict. L. R. 59, (1933).
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do so was equivalent to encouragement. This being true, and the element of
malice existing, the defendant was guilty of murder as a principal in the sec-
ond degree. In no wise is the court justified in holding the defendant an ac-
cessory before the fact, because the chief distinction between a principal in the
second degree and an accessory before the fact is "presence" at the time of
the act.89
SUICIDE IN THE FIELD OF CONSTRUCTIVE CRIME
In the field of constructive crime, suicide is considered criminal. At com-
mon law where a man was trying to commit suicide and accidentally killed one
who was attempting to restrain him, he was held to be guilty of murder."0
This doctrine has been affirmed in South Carolinas' and Nevada.9 2  In
Massachusetts it was held to be manslaughter and it was intimated that the
conviction might perhaps have been of murder. °1 In an Iowa case"4 similar
to Com. v. Mink the trial court was reversed on appeal and it was held that
since all crimes are statutory in Iowa and there is no statute making suicide
or attempt at suicide criminal, therefore the defendant was not engaged in an
unlawful act and his killing was not murder. This case is weakened by the
court's dictum which says, "Whether the attempt to commit suicide is a public
offense as a matter of fact has nothing to do with the offense of murder.
Murder is defined by statute. . . The killing of another human being by
one while he is attempting to commit suicide may amount to murder in the first
degree, as defined by section 12911 of the Code. But there would be no
murder in either the first or second degree if one, while committing a public
offense (except those offenses named in section 12911 of the Code), kills
another, unless there is malice aforethought and the other elements necessary
to constitute murder." This statement opens the way to convict the defend-
ant of some degree of criminal homicide less than murder as defined by
statute. 95 The distinction between the Mink case and the Campbell case is
that in the former the court, admitting that the attempt to commit suicide was
not an indictable offense, held it to be wrongful and criminal as malum in se;
while in the latter case, the court refused this reasoning, holding that it was
not enough for the offense to be unlawful as malum in se but unless the statute
soClark and Marshall "Crimes," 3d. ed., 199.
e0Reg. v. Franklin, 15 Cox C. C. 153; Rex v. Hopwood, 8 Cr. App. R. 140.
9'State v. Levelle, 34 S. C. 120. 13 S. E. 319, (1891).
*2State v. Lindsey, 19 Nev. 47, 5 Pac. 822.
93Com. v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422.
0'State v. Campbell, 251 N. W. 717, (Iowa), Albert, C. J., (1933).
95Doug1as Aikenhead Stroud, "Mens Rea, or imputability Under the Law of England," 169,
(1914), "'There may be constructive murder in the course of a felony, or constructive man-
slaughter in the course of any other gravely unlawful act, without any homicidal intent what-
ever. and in the absence of any culpable disregard for human life."
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made it so it was not unlawful, following Darrow v. Family Fund Society."'
Com. v. Mink is attacked by Francis J. Lippitt in his "Criminal Law as Admin-
istered in Massachusetts,''17 and William E. Mikell, "Is Suicide Murder?""5
Here again the two conflicting views as to whether or not the attempt at sui-
cide is criminal are evidenced. The most recent pronouncement 9 is contra
to the previous cases and in effect says that a man is entitled to take his own
life regardless of how disastrous to society the results may be.10 °
At common law another phase of suicide in the field of constructive
crime presented an interesting question which is now of academic interest
only. If a man attempting to kill another, missed his blow and killed him-
self101 or intending to shoot at another mortally wounded himself by the burst-
ing of the gun'012 he was felo de se; his own death being the consequence of an
unlawful malicious act toward another. If A struck B to the ground and B
drew a knife and held it up for his own defence, and A in haste falling upon
B to kill him, fell upon the knife and was thereby killed, A was felo de se;0 0
but this has been doubted. In I Hale P. C. 412. B is not guilty at all of the
death of A, not even se defendendo, because he did not strike but only held up
the knife, hence A was not a felo de se but the act was termed homicide by
misadventure. In Hawkins P. C.. c. 27, s. 5, it seems to be considered that B
should be adjudged to kill A se defendendo. That this other angle of suicide
in the field of constructive crime can be carried to extreme ends is shown by
the verdict of felo de se returned at a coroner's inquest upon a burglar who
was found to have feloniously killed himself without intending to do so, by
accidentally falling into the cellar of a house broken into by him. 10" Mr.
Stroud says, "One can hardly conceive a better reductio ad absurdum of con-
structive crime than the commission of suicide lucri causa, by pure accident"105
CONCLUSIONS
I. Suicide is a crime at common law. It is still a crime in the United
States unless repealed by statute or constitution.
II. Those persons who procure, aid, or abet the commission of suicide are
98116 N. Y. 537, 22 N. E. 1903, (1899).
97Francis J. Lippitt, "'Criminal Law as Administered in Massachusetts," 234-236, (1879).
William E. Mikell, "Is Suicide MurderT', 3 Columbia Law Review 393.
9°State v. Campbell, 251 N. W. 717, (Iowa), (1933).
100See 25 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 124, May-June, 1934. This same
view is set forth in Dawes, "Crimes," 72.
1011 Hale P. C. 412.
2021 Hawk. P. C., c. 27, s. 4.
1013 Inst. 54; Dalt. c. 144.
'"4Douglas Aikenhead Stroud, "Mens Rea, or Imputability Under the Law of England,"
169, (1914).
1ol5bid.
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guilty of murder at common law. This is so in the United States
(except in Texas), by:
A. Murder caused through a guilty human agent, or
B. Murder caused through an innocent human agent, or
C. Murder caused by compulsion.
III. The attempt at suicide is a misdemeanor at common law.
A. This is so in the United States today where the common law
is followed.
B. Where suicide is not considered a crime, the attempt at sui-
cide is :
1. Made a crime by statute, or
2. Is not a crime.
IV. Conspiracy to commit suicide is a separate crime.
V. Solicitation to commit suicide is a separate crime.
VI. There is no legal duty to interfere to prevent the commission of suicide
except in cases where one person sustains to another the legal rela-
tion of protector.
VII. Death of another person caused in the attempt to commit suicide is
murder.
Richard Wolfrom,
ELECTION OF REMEDIES IN PENNSYLVANIA
This note is provoked because of the lack of adequate indexing on the
subject of Election of Remedies in the Pennsylvania digests. An article in
Corpus Juris has proven to be of invaluable aid in its preparation, and so it is
only fitting that the definition therein contained should be iterated. "Election
of remedies has been defined to be the right to choose, or the act of choosing
between different actions or remedies, where plaintiff has suffered one species
of wrong from the act complained of.''
No definition, unfortunately, can be all-inclusive; at best it can serve
merely as a guide. Immediately we are forced to restrict the one above by
saying that the term, election of remedies, has been generally limited to a
choice by a party between inconsistent remedial rights. A quotation from
Patterson v. Swan2 states the proposition thus:
120 C. J., sec. 1. p. 2.
29 Serg. and R. 16 (1822),
